Fate is not over generous in giving opportunities
So wrote Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, in a long letter to his wife written on the fi rst anniversary of the Battle of Jutland. Having achieved his ambition of becoming C in C, perhaps the role that he saw as his destiny, the enemy refused to oblige by 'coming out' and giving battle. Beatty was thus forced to develop unfamiliar characteristics, above all, patience.
Given the scope of the war at sea during this period it is perhaps wise to state the parameters of this chapter at the beginning. The fi rst theme is one of strategy and tactics: how the Grand Fleet, the cutting edge of the Royal Navy's sword, learned the lessons from Jutland, absorbed them, and went on to prosecute the war between June 1916 and the end of 1917. The Grand Fleet is defi ned as the capital ships based at Scapa Flow and Rosyth and supporting elements based at harbours along the British East Coast. This analysis will look at changes in strategic command and direction which were made during the period, plans to break the strategic deadlock in the North Sea, and operations which actually took place.
The chapter will not bring in operations outside the North Sea theatre and above all will not examine the introduction of convoy and the long, complex campaign waged against the German unrestricted submarine warfare offensive after 1 February 1917, except indirectly when the U-boat campaign caused or affected other operations.
The second theme has little to do with grand strategy, but is arguably no less important. There sometimes exists a misapprehension that the Kaiser's Navy did nothing after Jutland but swing at anchor, its ships becoming ever more rusty and its men ever more mutinous. This is not strictly true and this chapter will show that the German fl eet remained a 'clear and present danger' in the North Sea and elsewhere, right up to the end of the war. It is, however, accurate enough to say that Admiral Scheer and the High Seas Fleet abandoned their dreams of Der Tag ('The Day'), that single cataclysmic engagement which would wrest control of the oceans from the Royal Navy, soon after Jutland. It was the only time that fl eets of big-gun 'dreadnought' battleships, built at enormous expense between 1906 and 1914, actually came to blows, and it involved, on both sides, 250 ships and around 100,000
